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It  is  well  established  that  backward-masked  stimuli 
can inﬂuence subsequent responses to other stimuli,
even when the masked stimuli are not consciously per-
ceived (Bar & Biederman, 1998; Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; 
Forster, Davis, Schoknecht, & Carter, 1987; Leuthold & 
Kopp, 1998; Marcel, 1983; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). 
Generally there is a positive compatibility effect, such 
that responses are facilitated if the ‘prime’ is visually 
similar to the target or is associated with the same 
response, or has some cognitive association with the 
target, relative to the neutral case in which the prime 
has no association with the target or any response. 
Conversely, responses are hindered if the primes are 
associated with a different response. Such priming ef-
fects have provided key evidence that non-perceived 
stimuli can elicit partial activation of motor responses 
or recognition processes. 
While positive priming effects occur in many para-
digms, counter-intuitive negative compatibility effects 
have been recorded under certain circumstances (Aron 
et al., 2003; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2001, 2002; 
Eimer, Schubö, & Schlaghecken, 2002; Klapp, 2005; 
Klapp  &  Hinkley,  2002;  Praamstra  &  Seiss,  2005; 
Schlaghecken  &  Eimer,  2000,  2002;  Schlaghecken, 
Munchau,  Bloem,  Rothwell,  &  Eimer,  2003;  Seiss  & 
Praamstra, 2004; see Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003, 
for a review). In this paradigm, participants are gener-
ally asked to make speeded button presses to leftward 
or rightward pointing arrows, which are preceded by 
masked primes that may be identical to the target ar-
row (compatible) or identical to the alternative target 
(incompatible). These primes are often not perceived 
at all, but they can affect responses to the targets in 
a biphasic pattern. When the interval between prime 
ABSTRACT
Masked  stimuli  can  prime  responses  to  subse-
quent target stimuli, causing response beneﬁts
when  the  prime  is  similar  to  the  target.  How-
ever, one masked-prime paradigm has produced 
counter-intuitive  negative  compatibility  effects 
(NCE), such that performance costs occur when 
prime and target are similar. This NCE has been 
interpreted as an index of an automatic self-in-
hibition mechanism that suppresses the partial 
motor activation caused by the prime. However, 
several alternative explanations for the NCE have 
been proposed and supported by new evidence. 
As a framework for discussion, I divide the origi-
nal theory into ﬁve potentially separable issues
and brieﬂy examine each with regard to alter-
native theories and current evidence. These is-
sues are: 1) whether the NCE is caused by motor 
inhibition or perceptual interactions; 2) whether 
inhibition is self-triggered or stimulus-triggered; 
3) whether prime visibility plays a causal role;   
4)  whether  there  is  a  threshold  for  triggering 
inhibition;  5)  whether  inhibition  is  automatic. 
Lastly,  I  brieﬂy consider why NCEs have not
been reported in other priming paradigms, and 
what the neural substrate for any automatic mo-
tor inhibition might be.
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and  target  is  very  short  (0  –  60  ms),  performance   
beneﬁts generally occur on compatible trials and perfor-
mance costs on incompatible trials (a positive compat-
ibility effect, PCE). However, when the inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI) is longer (100 – 200 ms), performance 
costs can occur on compatible trials and beneﬁts on
incompatible  trials  (a  negative  compatibility  effect, 
NCE). Such a negative bias has been measured with 
“free-choice” responses as well as speeded discrimina-
tion responses (Klapp & Haas, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 
2002;  Schlaghecken  &  Eimer,  2004),  and  it  is  also 
reﬂected in EEG recordings (Eimer  &  Schlaghecken, 
1998, 2003; Praamstra & Seiss, 2005). However, the 
explanation for the NCE has recently been the subject 
of extensive debate.
THRESHOLD-DEPENDENT  
AUTOMATIC SELF-INHIBITION?
The  NCE  was  originally  suggested  to  represent  an 
automatic self-inhibition mechanism that suppresses 
the  partial  activation  initially  caused  by  the  prime 
(e.g. Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Hinkley, 
2002; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002). In this account, 
the  prime  automatically  and  very  quickly  causes 
some  activation  of  the  motor  mechanisms  associ-
ated  with  it,  and,  through  lateral  inhibition,  some 
deactivation  of  alternative  responses,  leading  to  a 
PCE if the target is presented at this stage. However, 
in the absence of further perceptual evidence sup-
porting such response activation, an inhibitory phase 
automatically follows so that inappropriate response 
tendencies  do  not  develop  into  actual  responses. 
This  inhibition  of  the  partially  activated  response 
also  releases  the  alternative  responses  from  their 
partial  deactivation,  so  that  an  NCE  occurs  (see 
Schlaghecken, Bowman, & Eimer, 2006, for a more 
detailed  account).  This  activation-followed-by-inhi-
bition  pattern  comfortably  explains  the  transition 
from  PCE  to  NCE  as  the  target  is  delayed,  and  is 
seen as a characteristic feature of low-level motor-
control with wide implications for the production of 
both voluntary and automatic actions.
The theory has several potentially separable com-
ponents,  and  the  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  examine 
them individually rather than to accept or reject the 
theory as a whole. Most importantly, the NCE is hy-
pothesised to represent motor inhibition, rather than 
any perceptual interactions that might lead to the re-
versal of priming without requiring motor inhibition. 
Second, the inhibition is supposed to occur because 
the motor system detects unwanted activation – self-
inhibition within the motor system – rather than be-
cause an external stimulus triggers inhibition. Third, 
such self-inhibition was suggested to occur due to the 
lack of continued perceptual evidence for the partially 
activated response – in other words, whether inhibi-
tion occurs is causally related (inversely) to conscious 
perception of the prime. The inhibitory mechanism is 
also thought to have a threshold, so that it does not 
occur for very weak invisible primes that elicit very 
weak motor activation. Lastly, the whole mechanism is 
considered to be automatic, rather than driven by any 
volition to suppress the response.
The original theory has become known as “self-inhibi-
tion”, but to avoid potential confusion, it is important to 
note that some of its components are not captured by 
this phrase. For example, “self-inhibition” has become 
synonymous with the view that prime visibility plays a 
causal role, and has been contrasted with theories that 
do not give prime visibility any central importance (see 
below). However, Praamstra and Seiss (2005) proposed 
an alternative to “self-inhibition” that differed in its de-
pendence on prime visibility, but conformed to my deﬁni-
tion of “self”, because it envisaged inhibition that was 
initiated within the motor system. Thus the debate about 
prime visibility is logically separable from whether the 
NCE is caused by self-motor-inhibition or not, and in this 
review I attempt to treat each issue independently. 
Motor inhibition or perceptual 
interactions?
Mask-induced priming
An alternative to the main tenet of motor inhibition 
is that the NCE may instead be produced by positive 
priming  of  the  alternative  response  (Lleras  &  Enns, 
2004;  Verleger,  Jaśkowski,  Aydemir,  van  der  Lubbe, 
& Groen, 2004). These authors remind us that masks 
do not simply interrupt processing of the prime, but 
are stimuli in their own right and have the potential 
to produce their own priming effects. Furthermore, if 
the mask alters our perceptual representation of the 
prime, then the prime may alter our perceptual repre-
sentation of the mask – it is perhaps best to consider 
the  prime-mask  sequence  as  one  dynamic  stimulus 
rather than two static ones – and any resultant sa-
liency  imbalance  for  features  similar  to  the  targets 
could potentially cause patterns of response activation 
opposite to, or different from, those predicted from the 
primes alone. For simplicity, I refer to this general pos-
sibility as mask-induced priming, encompassing Lleras 
and Enns’ (2004)  “object  updating”  and Verleger et 
al.’s (2004) “active mask” accounts of the NCE.Negative and positive masked-priming
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In  the  early  studies  (e.g.  Eimer,  1999;  Eimer  & 
Schlaghecken,  1998;  Schlaghecken  &  Eimer,  2000), 
and  in  some  conditions  in  subsequent  experiments 
(Klapp & Hinkley, 2002, Experiment 2; Lleras & Enns, 
2004, 2005; Verleger et al., 2004) masks were con-
structed  by  superimposing  the  two  possible  prime 
stimuli,  which  were  most  often  leftward  and  right-
ward double arrows (<< and >>). This meant that 
the sequence of presenting, for example, a leftward 
prime followed by a mask was equivalent to presenting 
leftward arrows followed by rightward arrows super-
imposed. The appearance of rightward arrows in the 
mask  could  comfortably  explain  the  reversal  of  the 
compatibility  effect without  the need for any  inhibi-
tion, and it is now generally accepted that when masks 
are constructed this way, mask-induced priming plays 
an important role in creating the NCE (Jaśkowski & 
Przekoracka-Krawczyk,  2005;  Klapp,  2005;  Lleras 
&  Enns,  2004;  Schlaghecken  &  Eimer,  2002,  2006; 
Verleger et al., 2004).
Many more recent studies have measured NCEs with 
masks composed of random lines rather than superim-
posed arrows (Aron et al., 2003; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 
2002;  Praamstra  &  Seiss,  2005;  Schlaghecken  & 
Eimer, 2002, 2004; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004; Sumner, 
Tsai, Yu, & Nachev, 2006) and the appearance of such 
masks is not obviously equivalent to the appearance 
of the second prime. However, the random line masks 
still contain diagonal lines and intersections that could 
possibly  cause  mask-induced  priming  for  arrow  tar-
gets. It is common for the visual system to exaggerate 
novelty or feature differences, and this being the case, 
the features in the mask that are not also in the prime 
may be more salient than the features that are also 
in the prime, potentially causing priming of the target 
opposite to the prime – an NCE. To test this, a recent 
study deliberately introduced physical feature imbal-
ance into random line masks to measure the extent of 
priming this would create for the responses associated 
with  those  features  (Sumner,  in  press).  Imbalance 
of physical features ought to be a stronger source of 
priming than the suggested imbalance of feature sali-
ence created by repetition of prime features in normal 
random line masks. However, the priming effect from 
these physically imbalanced masks was much smaller 
than the size of the NCE, suggesting that mask-induced 
priming is not the major component of the NCE when 
random line masks are employed. Furthermore, Klapp 
(2005)  and  Schlaghecken  and  Eimer  (2006)  have 
found  NCEs  using  masks  composed  only  of  vertical 
and horizontal lines, or chequer-boards of rectangles, 
and thus sharing no geometric features with the arrow 
primes  and  targets.  Therefore  it  is  clear  that  direc-
tional mask-induced priming, produced through sali-
ence modulation of geometric features in the masks, 
cannot fully account for the NCE. However, note that 
the  masks  still  shared  temporal  onset  features  and 
spatial location with the primes and targets, and these 
features are also potentially important (Lleras & Enns, 
2006), as discussed below. 
Prime-target perceptual interactions
Although perceptual interactions between geomet-
ric features in prime and mask cannot fully account 
for the NCE, there may be other potential perceptual 
interactions. Lleras and Enns (2005) suggested that 
interactions  between  the  prime  and  the  target  may 
render targets opposite to the prime more salient and 
therefore  cause  an  NCE  (through  processes  akin  to 
repetition blindness or negative priming for example). 
Eimer (1999) originally attempted to rule out these 
types of explanation for the NCE, but since that study 
used masks composed of superimposed primes, a ma-
jor source of the NCE was likely to have been mask-
induced priming and we cannot rely on the results to 
prove that prime-target interactions are not important 
in other situations. 
Lleras and Enns (2005, 2006), using masks that did 
not contain any prime or target features, have found 
small NCEs only when targets and primes were pre-
sented  at  the  same  location,  and  a  PCE  when  they 
were  presented  at  different  locations.  This  may  im-
ply that prime-target interactions play an important 
role, but there are other possible explanations for the 
discrepancy. If interactions between prime and target 
can  affect  target  salience,  such  interactions  might 
also affect prime salience, and thus the latter may not 
have been constant even though the same primes and 
masks were used in each condition. More importantly, 
attention  to  the  prime  location  may  have  differed 
across  conditions  because  participants  would  have 
attended to the target locations. Attention has been 
found to modulate the effect of primes in this paradigm 
(Sumner et al., 2006) and in others (Lachter, Forster, & 
Ruthruff, 2004; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002). 
Previously, Schlaghecken and Eimer (2002) had also 
reported no NCE for primes presented away from the 
target position at ﬁxation, but they offered a different
explanation in terms of a threshold for motor inhibi-
tion, which will be discussed further below.
Other studies have found robust NCEs with primes 
and targets presented in different locations (Praamstra 
& Seiss, 2005; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004; Sumner et 
al., 2006), while employing random line masks which 320
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do not appear to generate much mask-induced priming 
(Sumner, in press). Moreover, in a control experiment, 
Sumner et al. (2006) found equivalent NCEs for tar-
gets presented in the same location as the prime or in 
a different location (19 ms vs. 20 ms). Taken together, 
the current evidence suggests that while perceptual 
prime-target interactions may occur, they do not ac-
count for the NCE measured in most studies. 
Source confusion and feature discounting
Huber et al. (2001, 2002) explained a pattern of 
negative priming measured during a word recognition 
task with a computational theory for ‘responding op-
timally with unknown sources of evidence’ (ROUSE). 
Essentially  they  argued  that  feature  representations 
activated noisily by a series of stimuli (e.g. a prime and 
a target) are subject to source confusion, and when 
participants are required to recognise only one of the 
stimuli (the target), they must employ a ‘discounting’ 
mechanism that estimates the feature activity associ-
ated with the prime and removes it from the decision 
about the target. In standard priming, the discounting 
mechanism underestimates the prime-related activity 
and thus allows some prime activity to inﬂuence the
target decision process. But under some circumstances, 
the  discounting  mechanism  might  overestimate  the 
prime-related  activity,  and  thus  overcompensate  for 
features in the prime, resulting in a bias against tar-
gets that share these features (i.e. a form of NCE). 
Huber et al. found that over-discounting occurred 
only for clearly visible primes of a long duration or if 
the prime itself was the target for an action or a deci-
sion, and so it would not be expected for the invisible 
task-irrelevant  primes  normally  associated  with  the 
NCE. However, the theory might be extended if par-
ticipants must discount the features associated with 
the clearly visible mask, and there is source confusion 
between the features of the mask and the prime, so 
the features of the prime also get discounted (J. Enns, 
personal communication). This idea goes beyond that 
of Huber et al. because their discounting mechanism 
was a cognitive process and was not envisaged to be 
sensitive to differences in feature representations that 
remain  outside  conscious  perception  (i.e.  when  the 
difference between the two types of prime-mask com-
bination  can  cause  an  NCE,  but  participants  cannot 
use this feature difference to discriminate the primes). 
However, even with this extension, the theory fails to 
explain why physical feature imbalance in the masks 
should produce positive priming, while invisible primes 
still produced an NCE (Sumner, in press). If the NCE is 
to be explained by over-discounting of prime features 
that  are  source-confused  with  the  mask,  why  was 
there not over-discounting also of the mask features 
themselves?
Self-triggered or stimulus-
triggered inhibition?
Above, it was concluded that perceptual interactions be-
tween primes and masks or primes and targets certainly 
occur in some stimulus arrangements, but they do not 
seem to account for the NCE measured in all circum-
stances (e.g. when random line masks are employed, 
and the primes and targets do not occur in the same 
location). Therefore it has been accepted by most re-
searchers that some form of motor inhibition is at play. 
Most accounts agree on the existence of mutual inhibi-
tory connections between response alternatives, but an 
additional factor is required to reverse the initially posi-
tive effect of the prime (in which the associated response 
is partially activated and the other response is therefore 
partially inhibited). However, the mechanism by which 
this occurs may not follow the original hypothesis devel-
oped by Schlaghecken and Eimer (e.g. 2002, 2006) and 
in Klapp and Hinkley (2002), in which partially activated 
responses  self-inhibit  when  perceptual  evidence  sup-
porting them is removed. Praamstra and Seiss (2005) 
proposed that alternating cycles of activation and inhibi-
tion are inherent in the competitive interactions between 
response  alternatives  –  perhaps  due  to  a  mechanism 
that  detects  and  opposes  large  activation  differences 
– and do not crucially depend on the presence or ab-
sence of perceptual evidence for the primes. However, 
the role of perceptual evidence will be discussed below, 
and for the present discussion, Praamstra and Seiss’s 
theory is also one of self-inhibition because the impulse 
that reverses the PCE into an NCE comes from within the 
motor system. A recently proposed alternative is that 
motor inhibition may be stimulus-triggered (Jaśkowski, 
2007; Jaśkowski & Przekoracka-Krawczyk, 2005; Lleras 
& Enns, 2006; Mattler, 2005). 
Growing evidence suggests that to obtain an NCE, it is 
essential to have a second stimulus (the “mask”) between 
the prime and the target, and that this second stimulus 
does more than simply reduce the visibility of the prime 
(Jaśkowski, 2007; Jaśkowski & Przekoracka-Krawczyk, 
2005; Lleras & Enns, 2006). While no NCEs were found 
when  there  was  no  second  stimulus  onset  after  the 
prime, NCEs did occur with “masks” that did not spatially 
overlap the primes, and thus left them equally visible 
(Jaśkowski, 2007; Lleras & Enns, 2006). These ﬁndings
can  be  explained  by    the  “mask-triggered  inhibition” 
hypothesis (Jaśkowski, 2007; Jaśkowski & Przekoracka-Negative and positive masked-priming
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Krawczyk, 2005) and the “onset-triggered suppression” 
hypothesis (Lleras & Enns, 2006), in which the appear-
ance of a second stimulus after the prime automatically 
elicits an “emergency break” or “whoops response” that 
inhibits motor activation. To explain the NCE, such emer-
gency break inhibition is applied most to the response 
activated by the prime, rather than symmetrically to all 
response possibilities. This idea has similarities also to 
the “cancellation-inhibition” theory developed by Arnold 
Stoper (see Klapp & Hinkley 2002, p. 266), in which the 
mask causes any in-progress processing of the prime to 
be cancelled and any prime-related activation is thereby 
inhibited. More data will be needed to ascertain the rela-
tive importance (if any) of self-inhibition and stimulus-
triggered inhibition.
Causal effect of prime visibility?
The original motor inhibition hypothesis proposed that 
inhibition occurred only when there was no perceptual 
information supporting the partial response initiation 
caused by the prime (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002). In 
other words, the NCE is predicted only for “subliminal” 
primes. However, several studies have found that NCEs 
can occur when prime discrimination is above chance 
(e.g.  Klapp,  2005;  Klapp  &  Hinkley,  2002;  Lleras  & 
Enns, 2005; Mattler, 2005; Sumner et al., 2006), and, 
conversely, that PCEs can also occur for a range of 
levels of prime discrimination performance (see e.g. 
Lleras & Enns, 2006). Thus the NCE does not appear 
to be associated with a categorical distinction between 
conscious and unconscious processes. 
However, while the transition between invisible and 
visible primes appears not to be special, a negative 
relationship between the size of the NCE and prime 
visibility has occurred in various experiments across 
several studies, such that the compatibility effect gen-
erally seems to be more negative when primes are less 
discriminable, and more positive when primes are more 
discriminable  (Eimer  &  Schlaghecken,  2002;  Klapp, 
2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Lleras & Enns, 2004, 
2005;  Schlaghecken  &  Eimer,  2006;  Sumner  et  al., 
2006). So the question becomes: Is there any direct 
causal effect behind this repeatedly found relationship, 
or does it occur because prime visibility and the NCE 
both correlate with other factors manipulated in these 
experiments? In many cases the relationship occurred 
in the context of differences between masks, so it is 
unclear whether it might be attributed to differences 
in mask-induced priming (Lleras & Enns, 2004, 2005), 
or some other factor involving the relative strengths 
of prime and mask. Additionally, given that more than 
one process can contribute to NCEs (Klapp, 2005), it 
is likely that these differ in their dependence on the 
relative strengths of prime and mask. For example, 
the  motor  inhibition  component  may  occur  only  for 
relatively weak (often invisible) primes but the mask-
induced priming component may occur for both weak 
and strong (invisible and visible) primes.
Klapp and Hinkley (2002) and Klapp (in press) have 
analysed the correlation across participants between the 
size of the NCE and prime discrimination performance, 
which has the advantage that the physical features of 
all the stimuli are held constant. They found smaller 
NCEs  for  participants  with  better  prime  discrimina-
tion performance. In this context is it interesting that 
Friederike Schlaghecken (personal communication) and 
I have independently observed that there are some-
times a minority of participants who perform much bet-
ter than expected in prime discrimination, and these 
same subjects normally produce a PCE rather than an 
NCE. However, it remains difﬁcult to know the causal
under-pinning of any such correlation. 
An  alternative  way  to  manipulate  prime  aware-
ness without changing stimulus properties is through 
perceptual  learning.  Schlaghecken,  Blagrove,  and 
Maylor (in press) measured NCEs with a weak prime 
and PCEs with a stronger prime, and then trained the 
participants  to  discriminate  the  weak  prime  to  the 
same degree as the stronger prime. These newly “vis-
ible” primes still produced NCEs, demonstrating that 
prime discriminability itself was not causally related to 
whether an NCE or PCE occurred. Kenny Yu and I have 
also collected some unpublished data using perceptual 
learning and found no consistent relationship between 
increased prime discrimination and a change from NCE 
to PCE. Thus it appears that the apparent correlation 
reported in many studies between prime visibility and 
the size of the NCE (or the transition from NCE to PCE) 
may be due to certain physical stimulus properties of 
prime and mask, rather than being causally depend-
ent on actual conscious perception of the prime (or on 
measured prime discrimination performance at least). 
However, if conscious awareness does not play a 
causal role, it remains unexplained why relatively weak 
primes  should  be  more  associated  with  NCEs  than 
stronger primes. The answer may lie in the relative 
strengths and differing time courses of motor inhibi-
tion and motor activation, both of which may occur to 
some degree under all circumstances. Inhibition may 
never fully overcome the initial activation phase caused 
by a strong prime. Indeed, if the inhibition is stimulus-
triggered by the mask (Jaśkowski, 2007; Jaśkowski & 
Przekoracka-Krawczyk,  2005;  Lleras  &  Enns,  2006), 322
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rather  than  triggered  by  the  motor  activation  itself, 
we might not expect it to increase in proportion with 
prime-related activation.
Threshold-dependent inhibition 
and the central-peripheral 
asymmetry
There  is  a  further  complication  in  the  relationship 
between prime strength and the NCE. When masked 
primes have been presented in the periphery, rather 
than  at  ﬁxation, or when primes at ﬁxation have
been  degraded,  a  PCE,  not  an  NCE  has  occurred 
(Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000, 2002, 2006). In these 
cases, the primes were weaker, not stronger, than the 
standard primes presented at ﬁxation. This reversal of
the relationship between prime strength and the NCE 
was attributed to a threshold mechanism that does not 
trigger inhibition unless a threshold of motor activation 
is reached (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002).
Lingnau  and  Vorberg  (2005)  systematically  varied 
prime eccentricity and size as well as mask-target SOA, 
and argued that rather than a threshold below which 
inhibition  does  not  occur,  primes  with  reduced  corti-
cal representation (either through size or eccentricity) 
simply produce inhibition with a reduced amplitude and 
slower time course. They point out that when measur-
ing at just one SOA, such delayed and reduced inhibition 
might be missed. However, this leaves unexplained why 
a relatively strong early PCE still occurred for primes 
with weak cortical representation. In other words, why 
is  the  inhibition  larger  than  the  facilitation  for  some 
primes (resulting in an NCE at some SOAs) but only 
equivalent to the facilitation for other primes (eliminat-
ing the PCE but never producing an NCE at any SOA). 
Lleras and Enns (2006) ascribe the central-periph-
eral asymmetry to the general principal of “repeated 
location advantage” – that priming is more effective 
when  stimuli  are  presented  in  the  same  location. 
However, on its own, this principle does not explain why 
the priming should be more negative rather than more 
positive. Mask-induced priming or stimulus-triggered 
inhibition can supply the necessary negative direction 
for the foveal primes, but then leave unexplained the 
same issue neglected by Lingnau and Vorberg – why 
weak or peripheral primes can create a PCE but not 
an NCE. If the ability of the mask to trigger priming or 
inhibition is diminished by its peripheral location, why 
is the ability of the prime to produce positive priming 
not diminished to an equal degree? We might specu-
late that the motor activation process triggered by the 
prime is less spatially selective – in terms of proximity 
of the stimulus to the expected target location – than 
is  the  emergency  brake  response  triggered  by  the 
mask. However, even this explanation would not ac-
count for the PCEs measured with degraded or small 
primes rather than peripheral primes (Schlaghecken & 
Eimer, 2002). The next step in more thoroughly testing 
the threshold-dependent aspect of the motor inhibition 
account might be to investigate whether the pattern 
of results reported so far generalises to all methods of 
weakening primes, and occurs also with masks that do 
not share geometric features with the primes.
Automaticity and volition
One of the attractions of the masked-prime task was that 
it appeared to be a window into wholly automatic and 
subconscious  motor  control  processes,  whereas  most 
paradigms of motor inhibition rely on the participant’s 
volitional will to inhibit a certain action. Indeed, the con-
cept of automatic motor inhibition originally proposed 
(e.g. Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003) may challenge the 
traditional distinction between “automatic” mechanisms 
and “control” processes, because it envisages a motor 
control process that does not represent top-down execu-
tive control. Consistent with the low level and automatic 
nature of the NCE, it appears to be no different in children 
and adults, while other types of control seem immature 
in children (Schlaghecken & Siman, 2006).
Although motor inhibition may occur regardless of 
prime visibility, as discussed above (e.g. Praamstra & 
Seiss, 2005), the argument for automaticity does rest 
on prime visibility. If prime discrimination performance 
is at chance (i.e., if neither the visual stimuli nor the 
response  tendencies  they  evoke  can  be  consciously 
discriminated),  then  any  motor  inhibition  associated 
with the direction of the prime cannot be the result of 
conscious volition. As I understand it, this logic must 
also apply to the “mask-triggered inhibition” hypothesis 
(Jaśkowski, 2007; Jaśkowski & Przekoracka-Krawczyk, 
2005) and the “onset-triggered suppression” hypothe-
sis (Lleras & Enns, 2006). Although the mask stimulus 
is perceived, allowing some involvement of conscious 
volition in a general “emergency break” or “whoops 
response”, the NCE must be explained by directional 
inhibition speciﬁc to the primed response. If the prime
discrimination  is  at  chance,  this  directional  aspect 
of the inhibition cannot be volitional (the same logic 
would  also  apply  to  the  feature  discounting  mecha-
nism discussed in section 1). 
A related question concerns the automaticity of the 
initial activation elicited by the prime. It has been as-
sumed  that  the  activation-inhibition  cycle  leading Negative and positive masked-priming
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to  an  NCE  occurs  only  when  the  stimulus-response   
(S-R) associations are strong, consistent with the idea 
of “direct parameter speciﬁcation” (Neumann & Klotz, 
1994). Arrow stimuli provide ‘natural’ associations with 
left and right responses and seem to most easily elicit 
robust NCEs (Jaśkowski & Ślósarek, 2007). NCEs have 
also been reported for other stimuli with left-right asym-
metry (Jaśkowski & Ślósarek, 2007; Sumner, in press), 
but for symmetrical stimuli, which are not so easily asso-
ciated with left-right responses, only small, if any, NCEs 
have  generally  been  found,  and  extensive  practice  is 
normally required (Jaśkowski & Ślósarek, 2007; Klapp & 
Hinkley, 2002; Sumner, in press). However, robust NCEs 
have recently been reported for button press responses 
to the emotional expression of face stimuli, which dem-
onstrates that well established S-R associations are not 
always necessary (Bennett, Lleras, Oriet, & Enns, under 
review, communicated by J. Enns). This ﬁnding may in-
dicate that different rules apply to the different factors 
contributing to NCEs. Motor inhibition may require well 
established S-R associations, while mask-induced prim-
ing may not. Bennett et al. attribute their result to the 
latter – a perceptual contrast effect between the emo-
tional prime face and the neutral mask face.
However, to say that motor activation and inhibition 
is elicited automatically by masked-primes is not to say 
that it occurs willy-nilly whenever the associated stimu-
lus occurs. Arrow primes have an effect only if the par-
ticipant currently wishes to respond to arrow targets. 
If instead the participants must respond right and left 
to the letters R and L, arrow primes have no effect, de-
spite previous training that associated the arrows with 
right and left responses (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). 
Likewise,  masked-arrows  bias  free  choice  only  when 
free choice trials are interspersed with trials requiring 
responses to arrows (Klapp & Haas, 2005). Thus the 
primes must be contained within the set of current “ac-
tion triggers” (see Kiesel, this volume). Furthermore, 
Sumner et al. (2006) have argued that non-conscious 
automatic motor inhibition can be directly modulated 
by attention. This kind of “conditional automaticity” has 
also been reported for other priming paradigms (e.g. 
Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003, Enns, this volume; 
Naccache et al., 2002).  It has also been reported re-
cently that the NCE is modulated by the proportion of 
compatible trials, despite participants being unaware of 
this proportion (Klapp, in press).
NCES IN OTHER PARADIGMS?
One puzzle created by the NCE, and a challenge for 
any  theory  explaining  it,  is  why  NCEs  have  rarely 
been found in other masking or priming paradigms. 
This  discrepancy  was  one  inspiration  for  the  mask-
induced  priming  hypothesis  (Verleger  et  al.,  2004), 
but if mask-induced priming is not restricted to the 
speciﬁc case of masks made of superimposed primes,
we might expect it in any paradigm in which the mask 
shares features with the primes and targets (and in 
order to produce effective masking, masks often do 
share features with the primes). Mattler (2006, 2007) 
has recently found NCEs in paradigm in which masked 
primes preceded cues designating which aspect of a 
subsequent  target  was  relevant  for  response.  Since 
these  primes  were  similar  to  the  cues,  but  not  to 
the targets, they possessed a ‘rule’ association, but 
no direct motor association. The NCE measured may 
represent mask-induced priming of the opposite rule 
because the masks contained the relevant shapes of 
both primes. However, such NCEs depended critically 
on having a mask at the appropriate temporal position 
in the stimulus sequence (Mattler, 2007), which may 
partially explain why NCEs from mask-induced priming 
have not been reported more often.
In the case of motor inhibition, if it occurs in this 
masked-prime  paradigm  (whether  self-triggered  or 
mask-triggered), we must ask why other paradigms 
do not produce it? One possible answer it that they 
do, but it is normally not apparent because the pa-
rameters needed to reveal it are subtle, and any non-
robust and unexpected NCEs discovered may not have 
been reported. However this answer on its own seems 
unlikely given the abundance of experiments that have 
been performed with masked primes of many kinds. 
A more plausible possibility is that primes can cause 
priming  in  a  multitude  of  ways  (e.g.  Mattler,  2003, 
2005), and only direct motor priming is associated with 
motor inhibition. Primes may partially activate a vari-
ety of representations from purely perceptual repre-
sentations to motor representations to “deeper” repre-
sentations, for example, of word meaning. In different 
paradigms, the relative importance of these different 
kinds of representation will vary. While the masked-
prime paradigm studied here emphasises motor proc-
esses (cf. the idea of direct parameter speciﬁcation,
Neumann & Klotz, 1994), word priming, for example, 
may place most emphasis on recognition processes, 
and  thus  not  elicit  any  signiﬁcant motor priming or
inhibition (although it might elicit other negative ef-
fects such as feature discounting, Huber et al., 2001). 
Directional  motor  inhibition  may  occur  only  when 
priming is based on very simple stimulus-response re-
lationships that efﬁciently evoke motor initiation. This
idea is in keeping with ﬁndings, discussed above, that324
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the prime has an effect only when the stimulus-re-
sponse association is well established and participants 
currently intend to respond to it. However, given that 
automatic inhibition processes have been reported for 
non-motor processes in other types of paradigm (e.g. 
inhibition  of  return),  it  remains  to  be  clariﬁed why
automatic motor inhibition should not have revealed 
itself more often in priming experiments.
NEURAL SUBSTRATE
Finally, it is worth brieﬂy considering what the neu-
ral substrate of automatic motor inhibition might be 
(whether  it  is  self-triggered  or  stimulus-triggered). 
Behaviourally,  the  NCE  has  been  found  to  be  effec-
tor-speciﬁc, such that primes associated with foot
movements did not transfer to hand movements and 
vice versa (Eimer et al., 2002). This suggests that the 
inhibition operates at an effector-speciﬁc motor stage,
and the basal ganglia have been implicated because 
reduced or variable NCEs have been found in patients 
with Parkinson’s disease or Huntingdon’s disease (Aron 
et al., 2003; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004), and in an fMRI 
investigation with healthy subjects, the inhibitory ef-
fect was associated with deactivation of the caudate 
and thalamus (Aron et al., 2003). However, a more re-
cent study reported no difference in the inhibitory pat-
tern between Parkinson’s patients and controls (Seiss 
&  Praamstra,  2006).  Meanwhile,  absent  NCEs  were 
found in two patients with rare small lesions of the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), which also has ef-
fector-speciﬁc representations (Sumner et al., 2007). 
The SMA may therefore mediate automatic inhibition 
upstream of the basal ganglia. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have attempted to divide the original 
interpretation of the NCE – the automatic self-inhibi-
tion hypothesis – into ﬁve potentially separable com-
ponents, and to brieﬂy examine each in the light of
alternative  hypotheses  and  current  evidence.  One 
important  consensus  emerging  among  researchers 
is that more than one mechanism can contribute to 
NCEs, and the relative importance of these factors de-
pends on the stimulus arrangements employed. 
In sum, mask-induced priming is important when 
masks  are  composed  of  features  of  the  prime,  but 
otherwise some kind of motor inhibition is generally 
accepted to play a key role. Whether this inhibition is 
self-triggered or stimulus-triggered remains debated; 
more  direct  evidence  currently  exists  for  the  latter 
idea, but this does not rule out a contribution from 
self-inhibition. Conscious perception of the prime does 
not appear to be causally related to the transition of 
NCE to PCE, but the details of what does cause this 
transition remain to be explained. The PCEs measured 
for  very  weak  primes,  and  the  associated  threshold 
component  of  the  motor  inhibition  hypothesis,  also 
remain debated and intriguing. Lastly, the motor acti-
vation and inhibition mechanisms involved in masked 
priming can be considered automatic, rather than due 
to top-down or executive control, as long as we accept 
the notion of “conditional automaticity” – that no au-
tomatic mechanism is free from modulation by other 
factors,  and,  therefore,  whether  these  “automatic” 
mechanisms get triggered depends on both external 
and internal context (including attention and current 
task ‘goals’).
Thus a component of many measured NCEs appears 
to represent an automatic effect of motor inhibition, 
but  perceptual  interactions  can  also  contribute,  and 
their  relative  contribution  depends  crucially  on  the 
stimuli used. How any inhibition is implemented and 
the necessary trigger conditions for it to occur remain 
debated, and therefore so do the speciﬁc reasons why
NCEs  are measured in  some circumstances and not 
others.
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